Verizon has gone to court to block the net neutrality regulations which are meant to ensure that ISPs cannot favor Internet content and services. The Apple Store is redefining the term of exclusivity, controlling every application you try to run on all of your iDevices. Even more, until recently, AT&T has been the only service provider for iPhones.
If we draw a line, we can see how the media behemoths are striving to grow their own “walled garden”. This version of the world is very similar to the future which Tim Wu predicts in The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. And with Verizon, Google, Facebook, Apple, or AT&T, that future does not seem very far away. World2.0 might resemble Gibson’s world but that is light years ahead of us.
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At first glance, the very structure of the Internet seems to support Gibson’s view of a world in which anyone can enter the cyberspace and access all the existent data. After all, the Internet puts everything one could possibly want within easy reach. However, somehow without even realizing it, the machines that we use on a daily basis are not serving anymore their original purposes. Wu contends that the new machines are “designed for consumption, not creation” (293). He illustrates this situation with devices such as the iPod and the iPad that, thanks to attractive interfaces, have managed to draw attention from the lack of power given to the individual. Here, a counterargument could be the ability to develop apps; however, these apps usually cannot be used on different operating systems and must be approved before one can implement them on his or her device. In this case, the information industry is more polished and more convenient, but there is also less choice. As Wu suggests, this is very much similar to what happened in the information industries from the twentieth century. Gibson underestimated the strong belief of conglomerates that they are the only ones apt to identify and fulfill popular desires.
William Gibson is quick to notice the importance of single individuals that work their magic in cyberspace. The “console cowboys”, as he names them, have the power (the brains) to rule the world, to access everything. The main character, Case, is the lone cyber-cowboy who works from the shadow and does not have any higher aspirations. However, Gibson fails to understand the complexity of human beings. Based on the theories of the economist Joseph Schumpeter, Wu points out that there exists “a special breed” – those people who dream of becoming gods, of founding private empires (29). After all, who does not wish to be the boss, to be better than everyone? Whether one wants to serve one’s nation as in the case of Mr. Vail or simply to enter the circles of celebrities as in the case of Steven Ross, most people have dreams of greatness and being renowned for their deeds.
In the world of Neuromancer, Case does everything he is told, even if he does not know who is actually behind the decisions. His indifference is perfectly illustrated at the end when he does not care that the A.I. has become “the sum total of the works” (269). Case can do all these because he is an outsider, a disinterested party. Wu is the one who emphasizes the importance of the concept of distance in the process of creating. While the outsiders “can afford to scuttle a perfectly sound ship”, the ones closer to an industry “face a remarkably constant pressure not to invent things that will ruin their employer” (Wu 20). At the same time, Wu stresses the importance of the “right” distance in order to innovate, a concept that is becoming more difficult to achieve. When companies like Microsoft and Apple are rising against open source or free software, it becomes obvious that we are heading in the opposite direction from the world of outlaws envisioned by Gibson. One might argue that all these companies are just trying to keep their businesses up and running, but all these giants have reached this stage of development thanks to the concept of openness of the Internet. Right now they want to close the circle, so that other players cannot disrupt their lasting supremacy. Even Google, the epitome of openness, has become a partner of Verizon – the same company that is very much eager to block free access to sites such as Netflix.
Wu shows how, as a result of this forced closure, creativity and innovation are severely limited. He describes the Kronos effect in order to explain how the natural process of innovation can be hindered by the works of the monopolistic companies: “the efforts undertaken by a dominant company to consume its potential successor in their infancy” (25). This has serious consequences as the numbers of lone outsiders are decimated and, more importantly, they are discouraged from reaching their full potential. As it becomes more difficult to penetrate the web created by large corporations, the idea of a 3D cyberspace, of the “consensual hallucination” that Gibson imagines, remains far-fetched.
Gibson feared that once we have access to technology we will not be able to understand its power and we would end up building artificial intelligences and destroying our humanity. Nevertheless, this has not occurred. We have developed AIs but we are still far away from becoming one with the machine. Apparently, the big corporations envisioned the same outcomes and decided to rescue us from a bleak future by controlling our power. The issue of controlled content has also been tackled by Lawrence Lessig in his work “Open Source and Open Societies”. He underlines the initial use of the Internet: “a space built on a commons, where because most early code governing the net was open code, and where because of the architectural principle of end-to-end, the network owner could not control how the net would be used – the resource of the net was left open for innovation”, but makes it clear that things have changed and the trend is to control everything one can do on the Internet.
There is another aspect that Gibson has not taken into consideration: the role of the government. The only example of a law enforcement organism is represented by the Turing Police which completely fails in accomplishing its task. However, at present it is evident that people still turn to the government for guidance; otherwise riots would occur all over the globe. We have not yet reached the stage when we do not approve of the government interfering with our actions. Thus, Gibson fails to analyze the implications of the existence of a government. Wu, on the other hand, understands that federal agencies play a significant part. As he perfectly emphasizes: “history shows that in seeking to prevent the exercise of abusive power in the information industries, government is among the actors whose power must be restrained” (304). So, while the government can be the only one that can divide the power of the information industry and prevent a monopoly, the government is also the one that can intervene in the market in favor of a new technology or a large corporation.
Wu’s future of a world ruled by megacorporations is definitely the most plausible one. However, this conclusion goes beyond the arguments that he presents. For me, it is simple the result of acknowledging the current state of affairs in the information industry. The view of monopolies taking over what we see or do on the Internet is not anymore a SF scenario, but something that could happen very soon.
What Gibson has imagined remains a revolutionary idea. Though, it is worth mentioning that both options have a negative impact on humanity. We can choose between two evils: the absence of freedom and too much freedom. It is also interesting if once Wu’s fears have materialized, Gibson’s world will not actually become a desirable escape. Wu debates that the attractiveness of the Hollywood blockbusters and the dazzling devices such as smartphones or iPhones, make most of us forget the danger of an informational empire;
“To see what is sacrificed to such efficiency, polish, and convenience, however, takes work, and to some it may forever remain invisible. It requires appreciation of the merits of systems in which, so to speak, the trains do not always run on time. It requires appreciation of the forms of speech and technical innovation that are excluded in the name of perfection and empire” (305).
While this is a valid statement, there still exists a remote possibility that everyone will understand the dangers of monopolies once we found ourselves face to face with the outcomes of ruthless empires taking over. In this case, Gibson’s wonderland might not seem just an illusion. Indeed, a rebellion against the corporation system might be set in motion and it might eventually lead to lone console cowboys ruling the world.
Work Cited:
Wu, Tim. The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. New York: Knopf, 2010.
Gibson, William: Neuromancer. New York: ACE Books, 1984.
Lessig, Lawrence: Open Code and Open Societies. Web. http://www.lessig.org/content/unpublished/. February 23, 2011.
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